Monday, October 22, 2007

The Case for Globalisation

I went into the Lexus and the Olive Tree by Thomas L Friedman expecting to be in complete disagreement with what I was reading. The book was described as an explanation and promotion of the ideas of globalisation in the modern world, and so I was expecting an essay on the glories of rampant capitalism and the unbridled march of “progress”.

Instead, and much to my surprise, I found myself agreeing with a lot of what the book had to say. Globalisation, it was argued, has sprung up as the Cold War ended in an explosion of freedom and creativity. The advent of the internet, e-commerce and the ease of overseas investment has taken power away from the state and transferred it into the hands of corporations, concerned groups and even super-empowering some individuals. Globalisation is working to break down barriers, increase standards of living and education (albeit not all at once), and make the world a more accessible place for business and for people.

Friedman was definitely pro-globalisation, but also proposed the creation of global regulatory bodies to monitor and enforce “fair practice” laws. He highlighted the danger faced by smaller cultures not equipped to deal with the overpowering influence of globalisation and its overwhelmingly American influence. He acknowledged that the power now placed in the hands of groups and people who are accountable mainly to themselves can be dangerous, especially in the hands of fanatics such as Osama bin Laden – a prophetic call considering the book was published pre-World Trade Centre Event (WTCE).

But, as much as I found myself agreeing with his argument (even if he suffered from the same “my friend” syndrome suffered by Al Gore in An Inconvenient Truth where everyone referenced seemed to be a close personal acquaintance), there were some points I thought let him down, some only apparent as events have unfolded since the book was published.

The book was targeted at an American audience, but it also tried to reassure foreign readers that globalisation was for them too and not to fear its impact. The USA stands for freedom and self determination (according to Friedman, and I happen to agree with him for the most part), and it has survived the cold war and emerged as the most powerful market on the planet, best suited to deal with globalisation. With broad strokes, Friedman paints the picture that the USA’s dominance also equates to it having the best globalisation-capable infrastructure and laws (“version 6.0”, versus communisms “version 1.0”).

This was my first qualm. I have no argument that the USA being today’s only real superpower, both economically and militarily, and for the most part it is doing a fairly benevolent job of it. But does that necessarily mean its “software” is the best? Actually, I would have thought that the sheer size and influence of the USA might mask any flaws with its infrastructure that are not obvious at first glance. The fact Enron is invoked a few times as an example of globalisation entrepreneurial excellence (with its interesting ideas of trading and buying what was in effect nothing at all) evoked a snigger or two from my end and undermined the assertion of the “great regulatory machinery” existing in the USA, though again, this is only possible with the hindsight of the years between writing and reading the book. While, again, I am no expert, the failure to really elaborate on what made the USA’s machinery superior to the UK’s (as the other “great globaliser”) or the machinery of a smaller but still efficient country did not convince me of his argument, though the points he raised as to what a country needed to have a good foundation for a sound economy in a global market did make sense.

Critics of globalisation didn’t get much of a look in, perhaps unsurprisingly given the context. Friedman did a good job of covering most of the downsides of globalisation – the dissociation, the potential loss of culture and environment and the potential exploitation of the less “economically developed” countries – but the protestors outside the WTO conferences were dismissed as ignorant factions, united only in their fear. It would have been interesting to hear some of the pitfalls from another person’s perspective, and while I am sure a fairly articulate one could have been found amongst the throngs.

Some regimes came in for criticism in the book as well. But most were dismissed with a “they will learn” attitude – all apart from the French. Two or three mentions were specifically made of France and its unique role in globalisation. Or perhaps it should be said as “in the context of the USA’s era of globalisation”. Because, whenever I read the criticisms of the French system, it seemed a defensive reaction to France’s continued criticism of the USA. As much as the French economy may need renovation to meet the realities of globalisation, the snide remarks at France were never directed at that aspect of their society, more at its opinions – and opinions are things the French are never shy about giving.

The thing that always gets me about an American (or NZ) reaction like this to the French is this: if you are a proponent of freedom and self determination, why are the French not allowed to have their own way of doing things? If the USA (or NZ) is for free speech, why are the French not allowed to criticise American policy and challenge American influence in the world? In this age of globalisation, where the big and the small have a voice, Friedman seems to be saying that everyone but the French is to be encouraged. I am sure many people found the mocking of the French quite amusing, but again I thought it undermined his argument about the liberation brought about by globalisation, and showed there are some prejudices that not even the cold art of economics might be able to breach.

Friedman finishes his book calling on God to bless the United States of America. Patriotism has its place, but I actually found this one phrase totally undermining the whole thrust of the book. While globalisation does not exclude nationalism, I thought that for a proponent of globalisation would finish a book extolling the virtues of globalisation, of pointing out that the USA is the dominant force in the movement, and calling on other governments to reduce their own influence to better embrace the new era of the borderless information age, with a more positive message to a global audience. Instead, the author finishes by hailing American military might (one of the great ironies I have always found in the American right wing is that the US military is never viewed as “social spending” and exclusive defence contracts American corporations (like Boeing) never seen as governmental “subsidies”, when in places like New Zealand, ANY government spending is viewed as just that), and praising the American way of life. My French part may be coming through in these final comments, but the apparent lack of self awareness that promoting globalisation while at the same time only viewing it through USA lenses is the major failing in an otherwise interesting and informative view of the globalisation culture we live in. If anything were to give me pause when considering globalisation, it is well-intentioned yet apparently blind people like this...

Verdict: A completely absorbing and comprehensive book about globalisation, punctuated by the human flaws that will make any system less than the theory would indicate it could be. A 90% return on investment.

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